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Lack of Governance, Collapsed Social Capital and Human Insecurity 
after the Sidoarjo Mudflow Disaster in East Java 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A devastating mudflow occurred in the Sidoarjo District of Indonesia on May 29, 2006, 
allegedly triggered by a technical error due to oil and gas exploration. The mudflow has been affecting a 
large amount of land and many assets belonging to individuals, communities, and central and local 
governments. By law, Lapindo Brantas, Inc., an Indonesian oil and gas company, and the central 
government were required to purchase the impacted land. Several countermeasures were implemented 
to cope with the consequences of the mudflow. 
This study evaluates disaster countermeasures from the perspectives of governance, social 
capital, and human insecurity. The victims of the calamity had to cope with insecurity because 
government efforts lacked proper procedures and social capital collapsed.  
 
Keywords: mudflow, governance, social capital, human insecurity 
 
1. Introduction 
A disaster suspends normal activities, and threatens or causes severe community-wide 
damage. This paper categorizes catastrophes as natural and man-made (Aldrich, 2012, p.3); the 
latter form is also known as industrial. Calamities cause loss of human life, property, and 
environmental resources (Garatwa, 2002, p.47). They have a greater impact than individual 
incidents such as traffic accidents, personal injuries, or house fires (Phillips, 2009, p. 19).  
Human security means people’s right to live with freedom and dignity, to be free from 
poverty and despair, with equal opportunities to enjoy all their rights, and to fully develop their 
potential (UN, 2012, p. 5-7). Human security has seven components: 1) Economic Security, 2) 
Food Security, 3) Health Security, 4) Environmental Security, 5) Personal Security, 6) Community 
Security, and 7) Political Security (UNDP, 1994, p. 24-33). 
The Sidoarjo mudflow occurred on May 29, 2006 as an eruption of steam, water, and mud in 
Sidoarjo District, East Java, Indonesia. The mudflow inundated more than 600 ha comprised of 
twelve villages. Experts estimated that effects of the mudflow would not end for another 25-35 
years. Controversially, some experts believe the catastrophe was natural, while others claim it is 
man-made, resulting from oil and gas drilling by Lapindo Brantas, Inc. The Indonesian Supreme 
Court deemed the mudflow a natural phenomenon, meaning that from the court’s perspective, it 
was neither natural nor man-made (industrial).  
The Sidoarjo mudflow is linked to all seven elements of human security. The lack of 
governance resulted in several failures to maintain security after the catastrophe. Village 
administrations also collapsed, causing a substantial reduction in public services for victims, such 
as public works, health care, resident identification and registration, and voting rights.  
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This study hypothesizes that the lack of governance during the mudflow impacted 
countermeasure policies, which in turn caused social capital to collapse and human security to 
break down.   
 
2. Summary of Findings 
Several serious effects resulted from the mudflow. Victims were displaced from their 
villages. Due to the lack of a monitoring system, the government only partially identified the 
victims’ situation. Only about 4,000 households out of 13,000 were reportedly observed during the 
evacuation. There was a delay in victims receiving compensation for individual and communal 
land, which led them to suffer severe economic hardship, in addition to a loss of social capital. The 
crisis also caused an economic recession in Sidoarjo district. About 3.3 billion USD in revenue was 
lost from 2006 to 2015, which disrupted the local economy. Village administrative services were 
halted. In addition, the high viscosity of mud caused sediment to build up in the Porong river and 
the Jabon estuary. The crisis led to the disruption of inland and coastal fishing activities, and also 
gave rise to disputes among the people due to claims over land between communities and districts.  
In order to grapple with the widening impact of the mudflow, Presidential Decree 14 of 2007 
on Sidoarjo Mudflow Management was issued. This legislation aimed to deal with the catastrophe 
and its consequences through a temporary executing agency called Sidoarjo Mudflow Management 
Agency (Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo in Bahasa Indonesia, or BPLS). The decree is 
the highest type of regulation for executing countermeasures in the wake of the mudflow. This law 
requires Lapindo Brantas and the central government to purchase victims’ land, and pay them 
compensation equal to or greater than market value. 
 
Countermeasure Policies  
The central government controlled communication between institutions to distribute data 
and information on the mudflow. After reviewing the communication network between the central, 
provincial, and district governments, as well as Lapindo Brantas and the victims, we concluded that 
the provincial and district governments could not maintain communication with Lapindo Brantas 
after the local team of the district government stopped operating. This error could cause the 
government to fail critically when implementing various countermeasures. 
 
Lack of governance regarding disaster countermeasures 
The Supreme Court considered the Sidoarjo mudflow to be a natural phenomenon; that is, 
neither natural nor man-made (industrial). The Supreme Court’s judgment resulted in the crisis 
losing the status of a disaster. This constrained the central government’s accountability regarding 
the justification of various countermeasure policies. There was a lack of adequate management, and 
the central government did not properly allocate responsibilities among the provincial and district 
governments.  
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Victims’ housing preferences and the present situation under forced resettlement 
The victims initially resettled without any assistance. The resettlement area is separated 
into three types: (1) housing provided by Lapindo Brantas (the KNV housing area), (2) Renojoyo 
housing area constructed by Pagar Rekontrak community group, and (3) other individual 
preferences (Perumtas II, Candi, Risen, Jabon, Ngering, and Jenggot housing areas).  
An econometric analysis revealed that job occupation and the number of relatives (close 
neighbors and families) significantly affected the victims’ preferences for where they lived. The 
analysis also showed the economic impacts on households after they resettled, namely: (1) the 
decrease in income from the head of the household, (2) the drop in income for workers, especially 
for traders, and (3) the job changes victims made after resettling. 
 
Critical problems of the land expropriation process 
The central government required Lapindo to compensate the victims. This responsibility 
meant the compensation process was a regular business activity regarding land, without any legal 
enforcement. However, improper policies and a lack of governance caused a delay in the land 
compensation process. Lapindo faced financial problems, making it impossible to for the company 
to fulfill its obligations two years after the disaster. Victims are now suffering from severe 
economic hardship and human insecurity. In 2015, the central government decided to provide a 
bailout to Lapindo so it could finish making reparations. 
In addition to paying people for individual land, another goal of this process is to cover 
village and communal land as well. However, the decree did not include compensation for 
communal land. The district government and village office could not monitor and protect 
communal land since the governments were not responsible for it. The lack of regulation over this 
type of land has freed Lapindo of any obligations. 
 
Loss of public services after village administration services stopped functioning 
Village administrations have a long history. Javanese villages are typically characterized 
by their maintenance of traditional institutions. After village administrative services stopped 
operating, the central, provincial, and district governments did not prioritize well enough to protect 
these services. The status of affected villages became obscure, and the discontinuation of services 
caused victims to remain unmonitored and unregistered. It was also hard to manage various 
countermeasures for them. The incomplete civil data made it impossible to identify the victims at 
the administrative level. They could not use their voting rights or access medical care.  
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The role of financial institutions in the recovery process 
The crisis caused an economic recession in Sidoarjo District, as evidenced by the decrease 
in the economic growth rate from 5.9% in 2006 to 4.9% in 2007, and the rise in the rate of non-
performance loans (NPLs) to 7.03% after the disaster, which surpassed the 5% regulated limit. At 
least 2,288 workers were unemployed in the mudflow zone and surrounding areas, and 740 micro 
and small-scale businesses closed. 
The central bank implemented the policy for economic recovery by using the banking 
system to reduce loan interest rates and eliminate NPLs. The provincial government facilitated 
cooperation between the provincial banks and the provincial credit insurance company to guarantee 
non-collateral loans for business activities in Sidoarjo. However, the banking system mainly 
worked for relatively large businesses, and its contribution to small businesses and farmers was not 
clear.  
 
Impacts of mudflow siltation on the environment, fishery, territorial disputes, and 
violent conflicts 
The mudflow not only included mud, but also other materials such as oil, gas, and various 
chemical substances that pollute the air, land, and water. Due to the unstoppable and enormous 
outflow of mud, BPLS decided to discharge the mud towards the river and the sea. However, this 
countermeasure caused other problems downstream (in the riverbed and the estuary). The mud 
siltation at the bottom of the river and the estuary led to environmental degradation, and caused the 
fisheries in these areas to collapse. The provincial and district governments were not equipped to 
execute the countermeasures due to the unclear transfer of authority in the decree. The inland and 
coastal fish farms recovered without assistance from local governments. 
To control the mud siltation, BPLS has tried to reclaim an artificial piece of land called 
Sarinah Island in the estuary. The mud siltation continues to this day because the project could not 
halt the siltation’s rapid development. The improper management of reclaimed land triggered 
another series of problems: the violent conflicts in late 2006 and 2015; it also caused a territorial 
dispute between Sidoarjo and Pasuruan Districts in 2015. The local villagers believed the land was 
theirs because it was unfarmed and not owned by anyone; they tried to use it freely without 
fulfilling the necessary obligations. Government Regulation No. 16 of 2004, Article 12 regulates 
ownership and the management of reclaimed land. This law implies that the central government is 
responsible for determining territorial boundaries, as well as managing reclaimed land. Yet thus far, 
proper action has not been taken. 
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The connection between the lack of governance, the collapse of social capital, and 
human insecurity after the disaster 
Based on the lack of governance, the collapse of social capital, and human insecurity, the 
Sidoarjo mudflow disaster can be summed up as follows. 
	  
Improper understanding of disaster status could have led to the lack of governance, because 
the central government’s basic countermeasure policy made it hard for the provincial and district 
governments to effectively delegate responsibilities to implement the proper programs. The 
mudflow’s status of “natural phenomenon” deprived the central government of the authority to 
manage the resettlement process for the victims. The resettlement was forced because the victims 
could not live on land inundated by mud. 
Forced resettlement without government control and delayed compensation caused victims 
to face human and economic insecurity. The lack of registration and monitoring of the victims 
(processes that were not authorized due to the mudflow’s legal status) made it impossible for 
victims to receive public services, such as voting rights and health insurance.  
The resettlement process did not consider the community’s role in securing victims’ living 
conditions. Residents of several villages that were entirely inundated needed to be fully removed 
from the territory during 2006 to 2010. However, the victims could not maintain their village 
organizations and integrity as a community. The victims survived by themselves and were forcibly 
moved to other areas. As a result, they were separated from their close neighbors and relatives, and 
eventually lost their social capital.  
Figure 1. Overview of the Sidoarjo mudflow disaster: Based on the lack of government 
countermeasures, the collapse of social capital, and human insecurity 
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Source: Author (2015). 
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Not only were villages flooded; they lost their communal land, which is an asset that keeps 
various kinds of social capital intact. The victims could not protect their communal land due to the 
absence of the residents from inundated villages. The district government was not concerned about 
the victims’ living conditions, or the loss of village organizations and communal land. The victims 
lost their social capital, could not receive various public services, and were not identified as 
citizens. After social capital broke down, it became hard for the victims raise their voices due to the 
absence of elements such as the community, institutions, social ties, community groups, and village 
support. Victims that are not united cannot speak up to improve their living conditions and protect 
themselves. We can conclude that the victims have faced severe problems of human insecurity due 
to the collapse of social capital. 
 
Policy Implications 
There are many studies on the causes, effects, and countermeasures of the Sidoarjo 
mudflow disaster. However, this study emphasizes the mutual connections between the lack of 
governance, the collapse of social capital, and human insecurity.  
We identified several necessary policy implications from the field survey and analysis: 
a) Government failure directly or indirectly caused the collapse of social capital and human 
insecurity. 
b) Improper understanding of the disaster limited the government’s role and reduced its ability 
to enforce regulations. This led to countermeasures being improperly carried out or not at all, 
especially in regards to monitoring victims and land, village administrative services, 
environmental governance, and securing human rights. 
c) Improper timing of government actions caused critical problems in terms of human security 
and disbursing the budget for countermeasure policies. Disbursement must occur within a 
properly fixed period to prevent human security from worsening. 
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論 文 審 査 の 結 果 の 要 旨 
インドネシア、東ジャワ州シドアルジョ県で 2006 年に発生した泥流噴出災
害の影響とその後の処理問題に関する研究である。災害の切掛けは、石油探査
のためのボーリング調査であったがその途中で熱砂が噴出し、周辺地域が泥砂
に埋まり、4 カ村が完全に埋没、他の８カ村が部分的に埋没した。２万世帯に
及ぶ住民が土地を捨て村を退去せざるを得なくなった。その後の事件の処理過
程では、政府の的確かつ迅速な対応を欠いたために、被災者は速やかに土地の
補償を得られなかったばかりか、一部を除いてバラバラに住民移転が行われ、
被災者の実態をモニタリングすることもできず、様々な農村行政サービスが失
われた。このめに、農村地域を襲ったこの事件は、農地、農業、そして伝統的
な村のコミュニティを奪うことになった。 
当論文は、この過程を詳細に追及するとともに、その主たる要因として行政
的対応の欠陥・不適切さといったガバナンスの欠落に着目し、事件後の対応の
体制、住民移転・再定住、土地収用、農村行政、農村コミュニティの実態、泥
 
 
流処理対策の下流域への社会経済的影響といった諸点を検討した。 
土地や住宅の補償金支払いが中断する、住民の移転登録が適切に進められ
ず選挙権が行使できない、保健医療サービスその他様々な行政サービスが受け
られないといった問題を生じた。さらに、伝統村落が維持してきた多様な共同
行動とそれを支える社会関係資本としての制度や組織が突然奪われ、またその
メカニズムを実質的に支えてきた農村の共有地に関してもその補償や所有権
の行方が不透明となったままでいる。 
これらのことから、ガバナンスの欠落が、行政サービスを停止させ、被災
者から社会関係資本を剥ぎ取り、人間の安全保障という点で深刻な問題を引き
起こしたことが明らかになった。とりわけ初動時点での中央政府の対応措置が
その後の州、県、村といった地方行政の対応を困難にし、被災者を的確にモニ
タリングすることもままならない状況に陥れてしまった。また、このような事
態に対して、地方政府は分権化といった状況下で独自裁量での対策行動がある
程度可能と推察されたが、的確な対応能力と履行強制力に欠けていたため、人
間の安全保障上深刻な問題の発生を防止できなかったことが明らかになった。 
本論文は、発展著しい新興国の事件に焦点を当て、被災者と農村がどのよ
うな困難に直面しているか、その対策の仕組みや制度、社会関係資本の崩壊と
いった点を明らかにし、新興国の人々が置かれている問題状況・課題を鋭く浮
き彫りにした。本論文は、ガバナンスの欠落と人間の安全保障という視点で重
要な事件に着目して分析した点が新しく、分析に必要な理論的フレームワーク
に工夫がある点、政府の諸法律・政策を詳細にフォローしている点、現地調査
により住民の実態に可能な限りアクセスした点、が高く評価でき、最終審査委
員は全員一致して博士の学位を授与することに決定した。 44
